Ever since the George W. Bush-era wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the so-called “War on Terror,” successive US presidential candidates, both Republican and Democrat, have campaigned on a promise of reducing the US footprint in the Middle East. Whilst different candidates outline different pathways to achieve that goal, the desired result is the same: A diminished military presence, fewer resources, and less time spent on the region.
It is therefore reasonable to believe that, regardless of whether Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump emerges the victor on November 5th, US policy in the Middle East will not be significantly different.
Trump may be tougher on Iran, while Harris may be tougher on Israel, but in the end, neither will be inclined to use the full force of American power or diplomacy in the region at the expense of addressing the threats from Russia or competition from China. When it comes to the current conflict in the region, Trump and Harris will almost certainly both maintain U.S. backing for Israel, with slightly different nuances.
A new Trump administration is likely to show unconditional support towards Israel, as he did during his time as President, whereas a Harris administration, while not fundamentally altering U.S. policy toward Israel, might adopt a somewhat more diplomatic approach to regional conflicts and attempt to pressure Israel to do more to address humanitarian issues and adherence to international law in Gaza and Lebanon.
Domestically, this lack of a significant difference between the two candidates’ policies, as well as deep frustration with the entrenched two-party system in the US, has catalysed a "protest vote": A deliberate decision to vote for a third-party candidate despite the futility of doing so, or not voting at all.
This frustration is perhaps most evident in the swing state of Michigan. Discontent with current U.S. policies vis-à-vis Israel and its actions in Gaza and Lebanon, coupled with despair over Harris’ campaign rhetoric, has fuelled initiatives like the Uncommitted National Movement, which encouraged voters to either refrain from endorsing the Democratic ticket or push the party to better addresses Arab and Muslim concerns.
The group amassed a degree of support during the primaries; however, despite the repeated appeals to President Biden and Harris to meet to discuss their concerns, they have largely been shunned by the party establishment. Meanwhile, an alternative movement has emerged that believes a vote for Trump is necessary, whether because he might be a more “pro-peace” candidate or because Harris should be punished for refusing to break with Biden on Gaza and Lebanon. The result is difficult to predict: It remains unclear whether the split will favour Harris or Trump when it comes to winning the state’s electoral votes.
Perhaps the greatest difference between the two candidates lies in their intentions towards Arab and Muslim communities and individuals supportive of the Palestinian cause. Some Muslims worry about another Trump “Muslim ban” and recall his incitement against Islam. Similarly, some non-US citizens fear he will impose “loyalty tests” on those visiting or seeking residency in the US or follow through on his promise to deport them, neither of which Harris is likely to do.
For voters disillusioned by U.S. policy in the Middle East who believe they are stuck between a rock and a hard place, a silver lining is that this newly galvanised community has an opportunity to expand their political activism past the election, and thus secure a greater chance of influencing future policy decisions in the region.